God People - Philosophy Dissertation - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 29 Words: 8758 Downloads: 7 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Statistics Essay Did you like this example? When God died, what happened to the people? Therefore neither can an animal move about in the closed as such, no more than it can comport itself toward the unconcealed. The animal is excluded from the essential domain of the conflict between unconcealedness and concealedness. The sign of such an exclusion is that no animal or plant has the word. (Heidegger: 1992:159-60) The concealed in Heidegger is that which conceals from us its being. What emerges in Heidegger, in his pursuit of this clearing, is the slim line the slippery border, between human and animal. The animal in Heidegger cannot see the sun as it rushes towards it: it can never dissocial the sun as a being. It is at once open and non-open, or rather, it operates in an ambiguity between the two fields. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "God People Philosophy Dissertation" essay for you Create order Man in Heidegger becomes that which is produced precisely at this border: at the moment of caesura and articulation between human and animal: it is this that passes for man, and it is this than expresses well the relationship of man to language. Man is never outside language: language is always already expressed as a radical exclusion of that which is not which operates as a fundamental category of exclusion(Agamben: 2004a: 91) The last century and a half have been full of attempts to move outside of language: to pass into new notions of subjectivity that move outside of what it is to be human. Nietzsches attempt to destroy traditional notions of subjectivity stands out as a crystallisation point in a process that sees Delouse, Foucault and Derrida, to name the three philosophers this dissertation will discuss, move outside notions of the human trapped within language and the creation of the subject. In doing so they criticise a notion of the subject trapped within binary constructions and the hierarchical notions of the subject that one finds in Hegel; in doing so they echo the criticism of Christianity that Nietzsche made. This dissertation will analyse the reasons for which Nietzsche attempts to destroy the traditional notion of the subject and replace it with a particularism notion of the subject: forever in astute of becoming that escapes binary configurations. We will evaluate to what extent he was successful in his enterprise, and what type of subjectivity was brought forth. In analysing the ways in which Deleuze,Foucault and Derrida take up his project, we will analyse a genealogy of thought that attempts to successively move beyond what we understands human. These three methods open up a series of liberating possibilities to philosophy and politics, and the configurations of these possibilities we be analysed. However, in the radical indeterminacy of Derrida, in the pessimistic, frantic activism of Foucault, and in the schizo-analysis of Delouse we can detect the same problem that we find in Nietzsche: at work in him is that oblivion (or as Bataille would term it, that excess) which lies at the foundation of the biologist of the nineteenth century and of psychoanalysis and what produces monstrous anthropomorphization of the animal and a corresponding animalization of man (Heidegger: 1992:152). Heidegger still believed, as none of the philosophers considered in the dissertation do, in the possibility of a good project of the polis; that there was still a good historical space in which one could find a historical destiny grounded in being. He, later in life, realized his mistake. In this, he comes toe point where his criticism of Nietzsche becomes most pointed. Nietzsches eulogisation of man is that which pre-empts the emptying out of value we find a man at the end of history. Nietzsche is blind to what the caesura of naming man as such might mean: in doing so, and in asserting the gelatinisation of the truth of the polis, the ambiguous border between man and animal collapses. It is precisely the essential border between the mystery of the living being and the mystery of what is historical (Heidegger: 1992:239) that is not dealt with by Nietzsches work and it is thus constantly exposed to the possibility of an unlimited and groundless anthropomorphization of the animal that places the animal above man and makes a super-man (ibid:160) of it. Life becomes reified over and above the precise condition of its existence; that very condition which makes it always already in dependency on those very grounds of its existence. We will find this same problem repeated in Foucault, who in his criticism of the construction of the subject in modernity illustrates the way in which modern notions of sovereignty act directly on the bios of modern man; this is where modernity begins to act on animal life(this time where equivalence has rendered the possibility of time null)and what is at stake in the construction of the subject is the possibility of his life. Yet, Foucault, like Nietzsche, illustrates this genealogy of dependence without being able to elucidate its historical specificity, which is in its construction of a zone of exclusion at the basis of ontology itself (this can be seen in Foucaults error in treating bio power as a modern phenomenon). This same problem is manifest in the differ and of Derrida, and in Deleuzes notion of the organs without a body: each in turns finds itself the symptom of the radical historicism. Each proclaims this symptom a cure, without realising that the cure they offer is precisely that which is the symptom. In all these theorists what this amounts to is misunderstanding of the nature of language. Thus, while Nietzsche manages to destroy stable notions of the subject, the unstable notion he replaces them with, while apparently liberating, exists within the same binaries he seeks to destroy, and moreover, allows for the exactly the same herd instinct that he seeks to overcome. I. Why I needed to kill God I.I We see ourselves in every mirror What, in all strictness, has really conquered the Christian God? () Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness taken more and more strictly, the confessional subtlety of the Christian conscience translated and sublimated into the scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price. To view nature as if it were a proof of the goodness and providence of a God; to interpret history to the glory of divine reason, as the perpetual witness to a moral world order and moral intentions; to interpret ones own experiences, as pious men long interpreted them, as if everything were preordained, everything a sign, everything sent for salvation of the soul that now belongs to the past, that has conscience against it. In this way, Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality. (Nietzsche: 1969:160) Nietzsches Genealogy of Morals outlines the way in which Christianity formulates its notion of the subject. The Christian super-ego is posited as salvation, as the point towards which one works. Thus, the Christian subject exists as, first and foremost, alack: it is not what it wishes to be. Yet, as Nietzsche points out, this lack is a condition and construction of the subject within Christianity: one resembles oneself and yet in order to find deliverance must become more of oneself and in doing so one finds justification for the present order of things. The Christian superegos to be found in God, and then, surprise, surprise, the Christian ego can be found placed in the soul of the body. This parallels the analysis that Foucault makes of the subject (1999, 1975). The law construct the subject as normal (and in doing so sets up an exclusion of the abnormal, or that which is not: that which has no voice icon-human) and in this process creates a desiring-subject, who desires what the law has not given it. Yet these desires are what are created by the notion of the subject placed upon one: one is created absent, oars not that, not this, but always awaiting a day when one can be called by a proper name. It is this awaiting a proper name that Nietzsche attacks most strongly, and in this theory of language we shall see Nietzsche allows no place for such a proper name. A proper name relation, Nietzsche argues, is always a relationship between a creditor and a debtor; it is always typified by the dependence or lack, and as such prevents the possibility that of morality to be free and joyous. Nietzsche though, and is not commented on very much, reserves some tender thoughts for Christianity. It is a primal Christianity, a Dionysian Christianity, that Nietzsche can endorse. As much can be seen in the quote that started this section: Nietzsches criticism of Christianity should not be seen to be limited to Christianity. Rather, it extends to all relationships of debt and obligation to a structuring super-ego. It was not Nietzsche, he claims, that killed Christianity, it was Christianity itself, and Nietzsche loathes the nihilism that replaces it just as much. We can discern three criticisms of Christianity/nihilism in the quote that started this dissertation. Nietzsche elaborates that one of the structures of Christianity is the idea of a puritanical truthfulness, which has been sublimated into scientific consciousness. Nietzsches primary criticism of this truthfulness is that is relies upon a correspondence theory of truth: it requires an external state that can be matched in some way to an internal state (which then requires a subject to have such an internal state). For Nietzsche, consciousness created in such a way in simply ashram, an intentional lie: consciousness lies free and unbounded it has no centre around which it can orientate itself. Furthermore, the mapping between a real world of existent things (Kants ding an such)and a subjective world of language is not possible. It is not possible because language only ever refers to itself. To use Saussures(1995:12) terminology, a sign can only have meaning within another setoff signs; it has no essential relationship to the world that is signified. A correspondence theory of truth attempts to hold up astatic a world that is in constant flux and in doing so negates the possibility of human freedom, which Nietzsche opposes to belief. The importance of this critique of the Christian subject will be returned to later in the dissertation when we consider Nietzsches theory of language. The second crucial critique of Christianity made in the quote that begins this dissertation is of history as possessing meaning, as divine providence being read into history as if it were a series of signs. This resembles the structural properties of psychoanalysis that Delouse(1983a, 1983b, 1984) was so devastatingly to criticise. One can read ones entire life as a history of redemption, as Benjamin (1986:112)comments. In this reading, every moment of ones life in which one fails, feels regret of guilt because one is not conterminous with the notion of the subject given to you, can be read as a sign of messianic moment to come: it is to deny the contingent and necessary existence one has in favour of a reified notion of being that removes life from life. Nietzsche realises that such a realisation about life is scary, and he realises that people will cling onto a Christian notion of belief even if it has no rational foundation: that is why in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1969) he attempts to convince people through rhetoric rather than argument. Several elements of Nietzsches thought here are important to note. While he attacks Christianity, in the long quote we started the section with he already observes that the technological-scientific paradigm replaces Christianity while adopting all of its tenants. As Nietzsche(1974:108) comments: after Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. -And we- we still have to vanquish his shadow, too. Science is this shadow: it refuses an engagement with the world in favour of a mystified detached observer who can sit back and observe the world rather than engage within its context. This DE contextualisation actually ends up relativizing the world. This is a radical historicism that believes the role of the pasties to come to the rescue of the future: temporality is shortened tallow only a present, an immediate pro cess of desiring-lack and sustenance. It allows for the feigned equivalence of all men, as they are all equal as subjects, and as all in this equivalence all notions of importance and goals are emptied of meaning by an effectively moribund set of values that deny life in favour of a search for authentic experience. This search for authentic experience is termed active nihilism in Nietzsche: it is an attempt to confront the emptiness of value categories with frenetic action: this is what Size (2001:48) calls the passion for the real: the passion for frenetic experience that ultimately culminates in its simulacrum. It culminates in its simulacrum because the passion for the real (as opposed to the empty appearance people inhabit) eventually becomes the passion for the real without risk for one only risks if there is something one is willing to die for: for Nietzsche the chance and contingency of the eternal return and thus we see the Nietzsche an concepts of passive and active nihilism end up, in late modern capitalism, becoming one. We can see that the co-existence of what we could term the correspondence theory of truth and the history as destiny theory (where everything is able tube reconciled to the present) inevitably end up in this structure of nihilism. Both of these theories rely on several underlying structures of thought that Nietzsche was also quick to criticise in Christianity. Innis analysis of the origins of Christianity, he notes (1956:112):Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, lifes nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in another or better life. Christianity was always underlined by a series of binary logics: this is not the right life: this one is better; hate: love, God: Satan. It is this binary thinking that comes in for a huge amount of criticism from Nietzsche. It is these binaries that ignore that the world is in astute of becoming, that it is forever in a state of flux. Nietzsche notes (1966:12): it may be doubted, firstly whether there exists any antithesis at all, and secondly whether these popular evaluations and value anti-thesis, on which the metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps foreground valuations, merely provisiona l perspectives. Therefore, Nietzsches criticism is not simply of our values, as we have seen in the previous paragraphs, but of the way in which our values are constructed. Nietzsches theory of language illustrates that each of the terms in binary series is dependent on the other. Butler (1990,1993) undertakes similar enterprise inspired by Nietzsche when she investigates the dependency of the category women on the category man and vice versa. Power is exercised, Nietzsche understands, in the formation of the very categories themselves, not merely in the ascription of certain people to good and certain people to bad. It is a mistake to fight for the category of lack, because the detestable thing is the very category: by fighting against the lack (e.g. of women for rights) one is accepting the terms of the herd mentality; that one must accept the givens of the situation and its binary categories. This is why a genealogy of morals is necessary, to (Butler: 1990:ix)investigate the political stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin. Such pursuit unseats the claim of a binary logic to an objective reality: they show them as temporal formations that constitute a world for the subject. However, such a world is always shot through with lack. One can illustrate this using Alcans (1981) theory of mirrors, which he derives from Nietzsches view of the subject. In Alcans view, one is never identical to the role one has been assigned in life. The social formation of life (which is an appearance) is full of inconsistency and incompleteness. As Christina Wolf (1980:151) comments in her novel: Nelly couldnt help it: the charred building made her sad. But she didnt know that she was feeling sad [my emphasis], because she wasnt supposed to feel sad. She had long ago begun to cheat herself out of her true feelings.Gone, forever gone, is the beautiful, free correlation between emotions and events. It wouldnt have taken much for Nelly to have succumbed to an improper emotion: compassion. But healthy German common sense built barrier against it: anxiety. The character Nelly feels the dissonance between the world she is in and the world she experiences: she experiences anxiety over it. Such anxiety is the mark of the problem of binary categorisation. This categorisation does not resemble the world, which is in flux, but it places over it a series of categories that are power relationships designed to constitute you as a subject. We can perhaps draw a parallel here between what Nietzsche analyses in his philosophy of language as the productive power of the grammar of an age and what Laplace(1989:130), following Alcan, calls the source-object of drives. These unconscious formations are an encounter between an individual whose psycho-somatic structures are situated predominantly at the level of need, and signifiers emanating from an adult. Those signifiers pertain to the satisfaction of the childs needs, but they also convey the purely interrogative potential of other messagesand those other messages are sexual. These enigmatic messages set the child the difficult, or even impossible, task of mastery and symbolization and the attempt to perform it inevitably leaves behind unconscious residues. I refer to them as the source objects of the drives. What one must be careful to do here is to distinguish between the early Nietzsche and his later work. In early work such as the Birth of Tragedy (1956), Nietzsche can still talk about an essential essence that the Christian or Apollonian reasoning hides. In his later work he fully endorses the view that consciousness is but surface: a radically anti-essentialist position that refuses the possibility of an outside of language or of consciousness. There is then, no real that one can break through the appearance to get to, as one might in psychoanalysis. However, that does not necessarily mean the psychoanalytic reading were doing here is incorrect. Laconia analysis departs from the Freudian analysis that Delouse criticizes in its conception of the subject. For Nelly, the character in Wolfs novel, the state fore-anxiety might be referred to as true, but a sense of what it is would be to call it uninhibited: free from the strictures of power. In the later Nietzsche, the ability to escape the possibility of the subject is ambiguous. What Nelly asks for is not an absolute escape, as Laplace does not ask that the child can master the symbolization of his parents and escape the drives. Rather, what is inferred is continual tension and thrust against that which claims to be objective and masks desire, put in a Delusion idiom: it is the consistent schizoid refusal to stasis. As such, it parallels the construction of the subject in Foucault. Like Nietzsche and Butler, Foucault performs a genealogy. Like the later Nietzsche, Foucault realizes the impossibility of breaking through language. One is always already constructed as a subject: any attempt to break out of this trap relies on an exterior moral framework that simply replicates the binaries of an existing power discourse. Foucault (1979:178) notes that discourse creates the object of which it speaks. Discourse gives rise to a subject, and an attempt to break out of the subject through a call to a value (such as revolutionary purity, truth) falls into the same power trap as existing political discourse. What Foucault and Nietzsche both call into question is the notion of valorisation itself: that which always assumes a dichotomousbinarisation. However, rather than placing their project within an appeal to the real outside of language, both claim the most one can does attack language through language. This task means to constantly reveal that which appears as objective as actually a temporally structured mask of power. Thus for Foucault (1984:217): The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them. This task has no end or limit: indeed, an end or limit is part of the notion of the structure of power; that there is this goal that you must attain, that you are not this, though at a certain point you may indeed attain it. We can see such notions of end goal rely on the interpretation of history as divine providence (or in the secular historicist version, history being called to the rescue of the present)that Nietzsche was so quick to criticise as ignoring the contingency and chance of existence. Both of these parallel Deleuzes criticism of hierarchical structure as that which inhibits desire and presses it into the service of power. What this entails is not simply the refutation of God at the centre of the world, defining the notion of our being. It is a refutation of a centre of the world. Secularism simply replaces God with man, and declares that the self-autonomous mains that which defines our values, when we do not act in a way accorded to by the hegemony, then it is us who ar e lacking. Thus, Nietzsche(1962:346) makes a comment much like Marx when he says we now laugh when we find Man and World placed beside one another, separated by the sublime presumption of the little world and. Thus, in Nietzsche it is not simply Christianity but its zombie replacement rationality that needs to be criticised. Foucault continues this task in The Order of Things (1994), attacking the Human account of causality and truth than requires a one to one mapping between things and their referents. This criticism is possible because, as Nietzsche notes (1968:616) the world with which we are concerned . . .is not a fact . . . it is in flux, as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: forthere is no truth. This is the strongest statement of Nietzsches project. He wants to undermine the notion of truth and reveal it for a set of power constructions and particularities. With the notion of truth, the notion of the proper name (the proper place for the human subject) becomes impossible, and what opens up is decentred multitude of consciousness like that which Delouse (1980:332) outlines in Mille Plateaux. This project would have what is productive as that which is nomadic, which refuses all forms of hierarchy in favour of that which is additive. To carry out such project it is necessary to destroy the possibility of belief. I.II Our beliefs are our weakness If there is today still no lack of those who do not know how indecent it is to believeor a sign of decadence, of a broken will to livewell, they will know it tomorrow. (Nietzsche: 1990:3) For Nietzsche, belief requires something outside of oneself. Indeed, belief can be understood as the opposite to freedom in Nietzsches thought. To believe in something is to believe in what that thing has made you into: it is to believe that one has something internal (belief) that can be referred to the world. As Nietzsche notes (ibid:347): Once a human being reaches the fundamental conviction that he must be commanded, he becomes a believer. Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. As we have noted above, it is not enough to simply get rid of God. What happens to the people after we get rid of God? They run together, as a herd, scared, into other formations of command, such as nationalism. It is interesting to note here Foucaults comment, that the challenge of nationalism (1994:228) was to establish a system of signs in congruence with the transcendence of being. It was to believe in a new grammar that replaced the old certainties of life with new certainties: the certainty of the glory of the death of the unknown soldier for the transcendent nation. That is why Nietzsche says,(1990:15): we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar. Nietzsches real challenge is almost a challenge against language: it is an attempt to consistently run up against the limit of language and refute its hegemonic possibilities (e.g. in the distribution of tenses) at every turn. A grammar forces one to give lie to a reality: the only such lies Nietzsche thinks are acceptable are innocent lies, those lies that enable communication in contingent fashion, that are not totalising and do not exceed the moment of their own expression. What happens with the new certainties is that they still rely on a concept of will. They ask one to partake in a world in which one is necessarily excluded (you are not this, yet). For Nietzsche (1924:14),to believe in the will is to believe every individual action is isolate and indivisible . Thus runs counter to the idea of flux Nietzsche takes from Heraclitus. Actions are not simply formed but are always already part of a social world that means individual isolatable action is impossible. As is thinking. Thinking (Nietzsche: 1968:477)as epistemologists conceive it, simply does not occur, it is a quite arbitrary fiction, arrived at by selecting one element from the process and eliminating all the rest, an artificial arrangement for the purpose of intelligibility. This process of intelligibility constructs a world in which one is dependent on the process of selection: thought, like and will, becomes a tool to be used: a means-end relationship that requires the a priori separation of subject and object, thought and world, that Nietzsche so convincingly refutes. He notes (1990:54) that the man of faith, the believer of every sort is necessarily dependent mansuch as cannot out of himself posit ends at all. The believer does not belong to himself, he can be only a means, he haste be used, he needs someone who will use him. In the hands of God, or secularism, agency is always placed outside yourself in the objective world that you lack. The weak believer who does not think that he wills(which is already a mistake) at least (ibid: 18) puts a meaning into them: that is, he believes there is a will in them already (principle of belief). To change this it is not enough to attack reason (as Adorn and Horkheimer do in The Dialectic of Enlightenment [1972]) but to attack the notion of the instincts. Instinct, while normally associated with that which is most natural, is in Nietzsche a product of discourse and habit over centuries, it is an unthinking subjectivity masquerading as the natural order of things. It is given by the law, and (Nietzsche:1990:57) the authority of the law is established by the thesis: God gave it, the ancestors lived it. To free habit, as we noticed earlier, requires not an attack on reason but an attack on habit, on unreflexive action: we need to liberate man from cause and effect. This task requires that man be liberated from the notion of the name. As Nietzsche (1956:20) claims: The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say this is this and this, they seal everything and event with a sound, as it were, take possession of it This feat requires a liberation from language. Here Nietzsche is at his most powerful, for he realises that it is in the very nature of language itself that the origin of power lays. Indeed, there is strong correlation between the attack on the sovereign in Nietzsche and Foucault and Saussaurian linguistics. In both the argument relies on the non-relation between signs and what they represent, and yet the continued claim of signs to be coterminous with what they represent, taking possession of it. Against this, Nietzsche wants to liberate us from names (1990:8). That no one is any longer made accountable, that the kind of being manifested cannot be traced to a cause prima, that the world is a unity neither as sensorium nor as spirit, this alone is the great liberation. This flux of things, clearly prevents the emergence of a subject: consciousness here, and for Nietzsches thought as a whole has, has no predetermined pattern. What we need to fight, for Nietzsche, is the giving of the pattern, the idea that the whole is no longer whole(1974:22). What is the sign of every literary decadence? That life no longer dwells in the whole. The word becomes sovereign and leaps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches out and obscures the meaning of the page, the page gains life at the expense of the wholethe whole is no longer a whole. I.III The Grammar of the Age, or how I learned to love the Word Life (Nietzsche: 1990:11) is a continuous, homogenous, undivided, indivisible flowing. For it is not the world that is simple and exact(what one could call the assigning of the world to the word: or to its lieu proper), rather through words we are still continually misled into imagining things as being simpler than they are, separate from one another, indivisible, each existing in and for itself. When Nietzsche writes this, he has abandoned the distinction between the apparent and the real world. There is no ideal for (ibid: 6): with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world. Such a world allows no notions of predestination, and no correspondence theory of truth. Anyone who speaks of such things is a liar (ibid: 38): One must know today that a theologian, a priest, a pope does not merely err in every sentence he speaks, he liesthat he is no longer free to lie innocently, out of ignorance. The priest knows as well as everyone that there is no longer any God, any sinner, any redeemerthat free will, moral world-order are liesintellectual seriousness, the profound self-overcoming of the intellect, no longer permits anyone not to know about these things. What do we replace this met discourse with? We cannot replace it with a singular subject: a new revolutionary ideal or perfect subject, for this would be to become but another priest. Nietzsche (1968:490)argues: the assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? . . . My hypothesis: the subject as multiplicity. . . The continual transistorizes and fleetingness of the subject. This is precisely what Delouse echoes half a century later when he claims (1983a: 5): production as process overtakes all idealistic categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an imminent principle. This multiplicity, one might ask: how does one get there, and what does one do when one is multiple, when one is the Dionysian figure who Nietzsche claims (1956:45) is in constant state of becoming, who is the nom inal I that is always becoming and his intoxicated state sounds out the depth of Being. In one sense for Nietzsche this is an idle question: one cannot assume multitude is something in itself, indeed (1968:560): that things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity is quite an idle hypothesis: it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing. Thus, the task for Nietzsche is one of a continuing freeing: of making morality (1966:228)something questionable, as worthy of question marks. However, the process with which that is done is problematic for Nietzsche. It is not problematic for Nietzsche because it leads to nihilism, as we have seen, nihilism is a problem that relates to those paradigms of thought that refuse life, that are drawn from a disgust at life (e.g. the moral Puritanism of Christianity and the detached removal of Science).Rather, it is a problem of how to achieve a freeing from subjectivity from within subjectivity. To return to our theses at the start of this dissertation, this is where Nietzsche makes his biggest mistakes. He fails to understand that part of the creation of the subject is precisely the recognition and foreclosure of that element which is silent and refuses to disclose being. Nietzsche claims the way we can free ourselves from this subjectivity is through the notion of the eternal return: to choose every action as if it was the eternal return of the same. The thought of the eternal return means ones leaves nihilism and embraces the contingency and necessity of life: one should understand it as an event: as a mode of being which offers up the world ones own uncertainty. As Heidegger (1991:32) comments on the eternal return, Nietzsche refuses to have life come to a standstill at one possibility, one configuration; I will allow and grant life its inalienable right to become, and I shall do this by prefiguring and projecting new and higher possibilities for it, creatively conductin g life out beyond itself. But though this is a step that seems to embrace becoming, it paradoxically only does so through an act of the will: the very thing Nietzsche criticised. It is this will to power that spreads from the moment: it has no objective truth, but reaches out from the moment. Thus, it is not simply the assertion that everything turns in a circle, as easy readers of Nietzsche might have it. Rather, the eternal return doctrine preaches that there is a dual movement in which the act and the doer, and thought and thinker are recoiled and drawn together at the same moment. It is a step towards immanence: it is against transience and all that passes because it offers itself up as precisely that moment: the eternal return of the same. Yet, this eternal return seems flawed in two important senses we will briefly explore here. Agamben (2004b:8) notes that for Nietzsche, the doctrine of the eternal return is designed to overcome the will to powers inability toaster the past, the it was that names the wills gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy , the fact that the will cannot will backwards. In Nietzsches voice, there is a vitalise that all his later statements on the impossibility of the real are unable to efface. It is in this form that we must understand contingency in Nietzsche: its only in this form that we can understand what might have been: where the present moment of being-in-itself is effaced in terms of what is. Every that happened then becomes, I have willed it: this is Nietzsches way out of the problem of the past. At this moment Nietzsches promising project collapses: for though he decries truth, it is at this moment that he says yes to truth, to a whole history of potency and will that his work had previously rejected. For what Nietzsche did motto was to say yes to what had not been. In this way, Nietzsches doctrine would have broken with the notion of the will and embraced areal of pure potentiality. This is a problem that Foucault, especially Foucault, Delouse and Derrida cannot quite avoid. II. Why I write Such Good Books, or why others then joined me. II.I We do not Lack for Anything Nietzsches task is to transmit something that does not and will not allow itself to be codified. To transmit it to a new body, to invent body that can receive it and spill it forth; a body that would be our own, the earths, or even something written. (Delouse: 1970:142.) Delouse sees Nietzsche as the prophet of DE territorialisation. Delouse, who aims his guns at Hegel, asks Nietzsche to triumph over the dialectic. He does this, Delouse claims, through the doctrine of the eternal return. This doctrine is most explicitly analysed in Difference and Repetition (1995). Chance and necessity are united in the doctrine of eternal return: what has happened, must have happened. This is not dialectical resolution of the situation, but a resolution of them in their constitutive difference. The doctrine of the eternal return constitutes a model of repetition, which of course for Delouse is precisely where one locates the production of difference (Deleuze:1994:37). The constitutive difference here is between the affirmation of becoming and the affirmation of the being of becoming (1983a: 24).Will to power here becomes simply a force, a differential element simply expressed as difference. Delouse uses Nietzsches doctrine to foreground all of his work with Guattari. Delouse argues for a politically militant unbound desire. Allot Anti-Oedipus (1984) is written under the sign of Nietzsche. It compromises an attack on the slave mentality of the day: that of psychoanalysis and the twin pillars of lack and excess in capitalism that finds its structural parallel in Nietzsches attack on Christianity and Reason. Delouse and Guitar also want to free desire from repressing structures. They find that scientific knowledge as non-belief (1984:111) is truly the last refuge of belief, and as Nietzsche put it, there never was but one psychology, that of the priest. The desiring machines of Delouse and Guitar pick up the theme of Libidinal economy and ask for desire to be set loose, nomadic desire that is prefigured in Nietzsches Der Wanderer (1924).Time after time in Mille Plateaux, they return to their theme. This reoccurrence is neither accidental nor repetitive, for Delouse and Guitar understand it to be constitutive of difference: this is the path of enabling positive flow disavowing power at each step. To what extent are Nietzsches children successful in their enterprise? They do not make the mistake of Nietzsche, asking the over-man to become a ritualistic cure, but there treatment of the eternal return is noticeably uncritical. Nietzsche sets up the teaching of eternal recurrence as a teaching of immanence, the ability to eternalise with a single act of will. This is why Heidegger (1966:95)detects in Nietzsches thought a residual subjectivism that means all his attempts to free himself of the subject ultimately founder. Delouse has no act of will in his ontology; instead, he has set up a plane of pure immanence. This plane of immanence resembles the particularism of Nietzsche: on its, all relationships are entirely contingent and relational. On such a plane, there is no possibility of subject-object relations; it is anti-state thinking in its purest form. That is why they quote Nietzsche so approvingly (1987:376) when he says private thinker, however, is not a satisfactory expression, because is exaggerates interiority, when it is a question of outside thought. Thought with no outside; action with no time, both Nietzsche and Delouse attempt to actualise a plane of immanence that means no conception of the subject is possible outside of flow. In doing so they both fall prey to the same two sets of problems. For Nietzsche, writing against God: the free could only seem wonderful. Was not it his kindred spirit Dostoevsky who wrote: If nothing is true, everything is permitted. It took us until Alcan(1981:35) to reverse the motto and realise: If nothing is true, nothing is permitted because it lacks any basis for possible action. Nietzsche failed to understand that the herd instinct that was undermined in Christianity and Science would fail to find its freedom in freedom, in the absence of any restraint. Instead, that very freedom was taken by hegemonic power as a matrix for further domination. Now, rather than people told one cannot do that (while secretly being extolled to do so, as in classic Superego relationships), one is extolled to do something (within secretly modified limits). The space outside of belief (the non-belief in science that Delouse alludes to) is not the space of freedom. Rather it is the space of what Nietzsche calls passive nihilism: the space where every possibility of action is foreclose and people sit and wait for the end. It is what is called the end of man in Keeve (1980:158). The end of history presupposed by the immanence of the eternal return leads not to the liberation of a new form of values but the value of non-value: the violence of a society where conflict is forbidden (Baudrillard: 2004). This indicates the extent to which Nietzsche failed to consider the critical question of the animal, as we remarked in our introduction. By failing to consider the bounds of language properly, he made the mistake of assuming an act within the Aristotelian logic of will could break through that which continues (transience). Thus, man was reduced to what is animalistic, and that which is past, that which is redundant, simply became an excess with no use. Do we not find the same problem in Delouse? Jean-Jacques Encircle notes what might happen if a yuppie reads Delouse on the train: The incongruity of the scene induces a smile after all, this is a book explicitly written against yuppies. Your smile turns into a grin as you imagine that this enlightenment-seeking yuppie bought the book because of its title. Already you see the puzzled look on the yuppies face, as he reads page after page of vintage Delouse Yet, what we find is precisely the opposite of this occurring. Those very concepts Delouse uses, such as the intensity of affect, we find today in modern capitalism. Modern capitalism undermines all limits, runs through a process of equivalence all differences (is this not nightmarish version of Deleuzes difference as repetition?): so that you may purchase a McDonalds burger in 10 different yet identical forms in ten different countries. The decentred capital flows of the net, without agency or subject, the slowly greater inclusion of more-than-human forms of sex within pornographic capitalism; all these indicate the extent to which Delouse has provided us with a mirror image of capitalism today. The difference between the two is that one decentres within a structure of power (and power does not abhor difference, it merely wants to structure its flows), while the other exists on a purely immanent level. Today, desire seeks to realise itself as the actual limits of possible expression (that which is left as natural) and at the same time remove itself from being a goal within the horizon of capitalism itself. We can see at this point that the body-without-organs, that moment of absolute foreclosure of desire(what for Delouse and Guitar is a sort of living death), resembles the organs without bodies. It is here we see the doctrine of eternal return most prominently displayed: it is in the unrestrained emphasis on immanence as a solution to hegemony that we can find the emergence of a hegemony founded on that very immanence. For both Delouse and Nietzsche, the problem remains that of time; how to find a way out of time without calling on a tradition that desires its own repression. II.II We lack only an eternal struggle Derrida takes up and uses Nietzsche extensively in his concept of the differ and. He attacks the notion of plat in contemporary philosophy at stemming from that same emphasis on productive action and will(which we noted earlier that Nietzsche founders on) that turns play into something where a subject manipulates an object, thus playing into all the dichotomies we have observed Nietzsche wanted to avoid. The space of play then becomes dominated my meaning. What Derrida does it to take up Nietzsche to show that play is a permanent property of any set of dichotomous categories. As Nietzsche notes in Ecce Homo, he is at once (1992) his mother, his father, a Pole, Julius Caesar and Alexander. He is beyond opposition and to be found in the play between them. As Nietzsche notes (1966:34): it is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than appearance; it is even the worst-proved assumption that exists Indeed, what compels us to assume there exists any essential antithesis between true and false. This play, for Derrida, is what we should be engaged in. It is this Difference that prepares us for venturing beyond binary thought(1973:154) that is for a difference so violent that it refuses to be stopped and examined as the epochality of Being and ontological difference, is neither to give up this passage through the truth of Being, nor is it in anyway to criticise, contest, or fail to recognize the incessant necessity for it. Derrida here assumes a more subtle position than Nietzsche does. Whenever fails to recognise the necessity for a subject, though he recognises that it is empty. He claims (ibid: 146) the speaking or signifying subject would not be self-present, insofar as he speaks or signifies, except for the play of linguistic or semiological difference. However, in his later work (1997:287) he outlines a reversal of Nietzsche that space does not allow us to go into here. He notes The Superman. To be sure, he is awaited, announced, called, to come, but contradictory as it may seem it because he is the origin and the cause of man. Derrida, using his strong links to Levin as, returns from the notion of a man-beyond-man to the centrality of interlocution, of man as man, to find a stable way to break with hegemonic subject: he construes the subject precisely as the difference that emerges in the co-substantiality of being. III. I am the Messiah: or why Life still awaits Redemption This dissertation has shown that Nietzsche does a powerful job of destroying the traditional morality of Christianity. However, his project founders on his inability to carry through a notion of human praxis that escapes the notion of will he so rightly criticises. This failure is bound up with the problem of how to relate to the past. The immanent ontology of Delouse and the eternal return of Nietzsche allow for no messianic other than that of the will, which proclaims, I did it. This allows them to foreclose the realm of the symbolic (that which, as Alcan notes, breaks with the appearance) in favour of asserting the totality of a decentred consciousness. The eternal return becomes like dialectics imp standing (Benjamin: 1987:118): it would allow final resurrection of the past no place apart from as a project of an imminent will: and as such, repeats the problem of a Christian notion of eschatological time. Nietzsche offers us a new form of expression; he is, in Malrauxs words, a great teacher, but the task of finding thought beyond the human founders here. To exist in language without being called there by any Voice, simply to die without being called by death, is, perhaps, the most abysmal experience; but this is precisely, for man, also his most habitual experience, his ethos, his dwelling. . (Agamben: 1991:160) It also founders on an even more foundational issue, which we noted at the start of this dissertation, and has been running as a leitmotif through it. Nietzsche finds his legacy of self-made morality in the world today: and yet he finds docile herds, paralysed by comfort and an absence of barrier. They are beings-without-centre. That Nietzsche did not appreciate this is because he did not seriously consider the exclusion of silence that lies at the heart of the human experience: rather, he assumed, being talks too much, it is an inexhaustible muttering of Dionysus or the learned whisper of Apollo. Without considering the emergence of a tradition as the emergence of a radical space of exclusion of the animal, he failed to see the principle question of ontology. If we analyse the word we understand what is at stake: the meta that forecloses the animal physics (Agamben: 2004a: 79).Nietzsches refusal of metaphysics looked to a new humanity: it should have looked at how is what made as such, the paper bridge he placed over this caesura is where Nietzsches scheme fails. VI. Bibliography: Adorn, T. Horkheimer, M. 1972 Dialectic of enlightenment. London: Allen Lane. Agamben, G. 2004a: The Open: Man and Animal. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Agamben,G. 2004b: Interview with Giorgio Agamben Life, A Work of Art Withoutan Author: The State of Exception, the Administration of Disorder andPrivate Life. German Law Journal No. 5. Agamben, G. 1991: Language and Death: the Place of Negativity. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Baudrillard, J. 2004: The Violence of the Global. Benjamin, W: 1986: Reflections. New York: Schocken Books. Butler, J. 1990: Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York: Routledge Butler, J: 1993: Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of sex. New York: Routledge. Delouse, G.1994: Difference and Repetition. London: Athlone Press. Delouse, G. Guitar, F. 1987: A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism schizophrenia. London: Athlone Press. Delouse, G. Guitar, F. 1983: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Delouse, G. 1984: Nietzsche and Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press. Delouse, G. Guitar, F. 1980: Capitalisme et Schizophrnie, tome 2 : Mille Plateaux. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Delouse, G. 1970: Nomad Thought. In, The New Nietzsche: ContemporaryStyles of Interpretation (Ed. Allinson, D.). New York: Delta Books. Derrida, J. 1976: Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Pres. Derrida, J. 1973: Speech and Phenomena: and Other Essays on Husserls Theory of Signs. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Foucault, M. 1999: History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Know. Penguin: London. Foucault, M. 1994: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Vintage: London. Foucault, M. 1986: On Human Nature. In The Foucault Reader (Ed. Rabinow, P.). Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press. Foucault, M. 1975: Discipline and Punish. Penguin: London. Heidegger, M. 1992: Parmenides. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. 1991: Volume Two: The Eternal Reccurence of the Same. London: Harper Collins. Heidegger, M. 1977: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper Row. Keeve, A. 1980: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. New York: Cornell University Press. Alcan, J. 1981: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. New York: W. Norton. Laplace, J. 1989: New Foundations for Psychoanalysis. Oxford: Blackwell. Encircle, J. 1996: The Pedagogy of Philosophy. Radical Philosophy. No. 75, pp. 44. Nietzsche, F. 1992: Ecce Homo. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Nietzsche, F. 1990: Twilight of the Idols. New York: Vintage Books. Nietzsche, F. 1991: The Anti-Christ. New York: Vintage Books Nietzsche, F. 1989: On the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Random House. Nietzsche, F. 1974: The Gay Science. New York: Vintage Books. Nietzsche, F. 1973: Beyond Good and Evil. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Nietzsche, F. 1969: Thus Spoke Zarathustra. London: Penguin Books. Nietzsche, F. 1968: The W ill to Power. New York: Vintage Books. Nietzsche, F. 1956: The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals. Garden City: New York. Nietzsche, F. 1924: Der Wanderer. Freiburg: C.F.Kant. Saussure, F. de. 1995: General Course in Linguistics. London: Gerald Duckworth. Wolf, C. 1980: A Model Childhood. New York: Farrar. Size, S. 2001: Welcome to the Desert of the Real. Verso: London.

Abnormal Behaviors - 889 Words

1. Your uncle consumes a quart of whiskey per day; he has trouble remembering the names of those around him. Drinking alcohol in some limit may be considered as normal behavior. However, since drinking quarter of whiskey clearly effects brain and bodily functions, we can say this behavior is abnormal. Possible diagnoses would be substance use disorders. One can be drunk after he or she got divorced, however this is not a sign of mental disorder. However, it is clear that my uncle suffers from every day drinking habit. Additionally, if my uncle has trouble remembering the names around him, this indicates that there is an abnormality in brain functions related to memory. We may need to know if he remembers the names in normal times and if†¦show more content†¦This behavior cannot be considered as normal in any condition. There are no cultural differences in such disorder, she will have be diagnosed with same disorder in all countries. 3. Your neighbor has vague physical complaints and sees 2-3 doctors a month. This behavior is abnormal. As in Freud’s Anna O. case (Barlow, Durand, 2012) my neighbor have hysterical symptoms. When normal people are sick, they usually have one or two complains regarding to an illness and once this illness diagnosed, treatment process starts. There is no need to go doctors to doctors. Therefore my neighbor is not seeking to become healthy again, instead he or she seeking to get attention. Additional information may be needed to make sure if he or she has really histrionic personality disorder. How long this behavior continues? Is she or he showing other abnormal behavior such as drinking a lot of pills and worrying and talking about other illnesses? This behavior is normal if she or he has chronic illnesses such as cancer or AIDS. From cultural perspective, I believe there should not be any different to diagnose such behavior. 4. Your neighbor sweeps, washes, and scrubs his driveway daily. 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Humanitarian Response to Darfur Crisis Free Essays

string(99) " the administration in Khartoum has some implications to the concept of Responsibility to Protect\." Introduction From time being, a massive violation and abuse of the fundamental human rights exists. In the most recent era, the advent of the last three decades experienced a shift of these violations from the trendy inter-state conflicts to all forms of internal threats. Conversely, the last one hundred years has witnessed a sizeable increase in international collaboration and solidarity. We will write a custom essay sample on Humanitarian Response to Darfur Crisis or any similar topic only for you Order Now Human efforts to combat crime and engage in activities to promote human welfare and security have resulted in the conception of international organizations such as the UN and NATO. Subsequently, the 20th century has witness a massive contradiction trapped between humanity’s motivation to contest all forms of threats associated with mankind and its apparent failure to effectively activate and execute its intended actions. More than ever, serious human right breach is still experienced in today’s world. The Libya crisis which still dominates the headlines of every media is a notable example. While it evident that threats to humanity cuts across the globe, a pragmatic observation indicates that most of perpetrators of these crimes against humanity are mostly seen in the third world where dictatorship administration still exists (Thomas et al., 2002). While all sovereign states reserves the right to administer its territory, contemporary security issues might necessitate intervention by others at some point in-time for the welfare of humanity. With this in mind, several factors that make this view well contested still persist. Claiming that one can absolutely intervene in issues that threaten humanity will be approving of a subject that is not precisely limited and open to several interpretations. The concept of Responsibility to Protect challenges the states to protect not only its own people, but also, those people whose state have failed to protect. This essay particularly focuses on crises involving situations where the state has been accused of engaging in the act of genocide. A crime listed among the four crimes against humanity in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. For a better insight, I will explore the case of Darfur and how the international community responded to it. This will enable a proper engagement with the debate on the Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention taking into consideration the sovereignty of a state. Darfur: Background to the crisis For close to a decade, the world witnessed a horrified situation similar to that of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. About 4.2 million Darfuri civilians were victim of a bloody massacre, brutal rape and a direct displacement from their immediate homes (ICRtoP, 2010). The crisis which is believed to have its roots in a long term marginalization and neglect of the Furs, the Massalit, and the Zaghawa tribes by the successive governing regime from Khartoum was aggravated byDarfur’s segregation from the North-South regional peace process in 2003 (HCIDC, 2005, p:9). The cliche state of affairs to Darfur crisis is that of the marginalized group taking up arms in opposition to the government in Khartoum which was equally and fatally countered by the Arab militia in a bloody ethnic cleansing (Brosche, 2008, p:5). Undisputedly, the perpetrators of these atrocious acts are the Sudanese government-supported Janjaweed Military Group. With no form of over-estimation, at least 400,000 people have been murdered in the statistics presented by the Humanitarian Affairs Chapter of the United Nations (ICRtoP, 2010). Although the Sudanese government has been accused of master-minding a drive of ethnic cleansing by means of an alternative armed forces, yet, the international community of states having the ability to quell the unrest in the troubled Darfur region failed to take the lead in exemplifying actions that will protect the vulnerable civilians due to contradicting interest between geopolitical concerns and a deficient political motivation (ICRtoP, 2010). Without any prejudice, the Sudanese government blatantly overlooked the welfare of its people by failing in their Responsibility to Protect the Dafuris. In this situation, the Responsibility to Protect, though contested by different school of thoughts becomes an objective to be upheld by the international community of states if the rights and welfare of the agonized Dafuris has to be preserved. Certain theoretical perspective will possibly explain the behaviour of certain states and the international community. A general overview of realism and liberalism theory will sufficiently highlight basic opinion which has fashioned observers intuitive assumptions about humanitarian interventions (Hehir, 2010, p: 61). Theorectical Perspectives The lethargic attitude and lack of political motivation of the international community to respond to the crises in Darfur invariably corroborates John Mearsheimer in his renowned and stimulating write-up titled â€Å"The False Hope of International Institution†. His argument is relatively rigid because the situation in Darfur seems to favor his opinion which forwards that a failed state does not necessitate intervention from external nations except there is a relative gain (1994, p: 12). International institutions hardly ever exert any momentous authority on states actions and as such, subject itself to criticisms (Donnelly, 2000: p 132). For example, nine main decrees coupled with 21 presidential statements have been adopted since the inception of the crises in Darfur, yet, the situation has at its best remained the same and at its worse deteriorated further (Prendergast et al, 2008, p: 2). Classical realist like Mearsheimer argues that the international community is prone to failures in its Responsibility to Protect, hence, unreliable. Neo realist on the other hand, will bother less about morals, which significantly damages the idea of humanitarian intervention. Realists like E. H Carr continuously asserts that, morality are mere initiatives of the super powers to continue to enjoy perpetual domination in every possible capacity by advocating humanitarian intervention (Hehir, 2010, p: 61). That said, the realism perspective to the crisis in Darfur possibly explains the slow response of the international community. Various states constituting the Security Council’s political interest invariably determines the effectiveness of any intervention. Though the regime in Washington was the first to label the crisis in Darfur Genocide, however, the mix of sanctions and its obvious interest to get information about Al-Qaeda from the administration in Khartoum has some implications to the concept of Responsibility to Protect. You read "Humanitarian Response to Darfur Crisis" in category "Essay examples" The United States constitutes a potential member of the Security Council. Thus, its political will to support Humanitarian Intervention will go a long way to ensure the success in Darfur (Brosche, 2008, p: 96). These actions have some realism in itself, in that every state should ensure its own survival. Realism as an IR theory suggest that, the well-being of a state should never be committed to any form of international covenant, and efforts of global governance through international norms should be resisted since behaviours of over-arching bodies are controlled by the interest of the super powers constituting them (Kegley, 2007: p 31). This standpoint advocates a logical agreement. If the argument by realist represents human beings as intensely flawed and naturally egocentric, then the proposal of building an ideal world is meaningless. Not in any degree can an organization be more powerful to the qualities of its constituting members. Therefore, global tranquility becomes a target outside the scope of any distinct state party. Just as one’s personal heart desires cannot be controlled by another, so also a state fundamental ethics cannot be determined by others. Though influence can sometimes be persuasive, however, the explicit approval to give the final verdict resides within the individual states. Liberalism on the other hand advocates that international peace is possible and can be acquired through the teamwork of individual states. Though there are different variant of the liberal assumptions, however, the fundamentals of this school of thought emphasizes moral standards over the quest of power. It defines politics at the global level as contend for consensus rather than a struggle for supremacy and status. Kant’s approach of this theory tells us that â€Å"peace can be perpetual†. Therefore, conflicts are absurd and going against nature. It is a simulated contrivance and not a result of some distinguished traits of human nature (Burchill et al., 2009: p 58). For this argument, the international community must identify itself in other to abolish those institutions that make conflict probable. States must also reconstruct their political structures so that democratic control and social liberties within states can protect human privileges and facilitate healthier relations amongst states. (Kegley, 2007: p 26-27). Followers of this idea will likely agree that â€Å"every extreme abuse of human rights deserves intervention by the whole human race falling under the international community for humanitarian purposes† (Annan, 2004). Since NATO’s interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1995 and 1999 respectively were considered a relative success by some, then this approach possibly explains the reactions of some commentators as regards to the crisis in Darfur and subsequently, identifies itself with the norm of humanitarian intervention (Miller, 2010, p: 150). International Community Response in Darfur: A failure to intervene The ineffective action in Rwanda makes it difficult to find who absolutely defies intervention in the twentieth century. Though several bias still exist among different commentators especially when interventions involves military actions, however, projections of success in a deteriorating instance may theoretically rationalize humanitarian intervention (Abbott, 2005, p: 15). There is a general support, if not total concurrence which substantiate humanitarian interventions whenever there exist a gross breach of human welfare. However, who takes charge of intervention and who dictates when to do so appear to be a major concern (Pattison, 2010, p: 2). The UN has been the platform from which the global affair of human rights transpires. It was the UN that first launched international models that protects the rights of individuals and groups enclosed in the UN Charter (United Nations, 1948). Consequently, the UN is usually reprimanded whenever there is a case of substantial human rights infringement. There is no better accountability for this judgment other than its recognition as the most universal entity whose objective accommodates every nation state as much as possible. The obscurity associated with humanitarian intervention generally is that, it is very expanse in scope and as such commits it to several interpretation and criticisms from one state to another and even among individuals. To clarify the unclearness in the Human Rights Documents, 18 Human Rights expert were elected to deal with such contention (OHCHR, 1996). In the final ordeal of clarification, the UN Security Council reserves the right to decide if the circumstance necessitates intervention by them or any other party. However, implementing these laws in most cases has been quite difficult. For example, Milosevic’s prosecution process was a drama as the massacre in Bosnia was subjected to several interpretations and criticisms (PPU, 1995). In the occurrence of similar situations involving crimes against humanity, especially when a state which is meant to ensure the welfare of its citizens ridiculously turn around and becomes a major threat to its own people like that which is presently experienced in Libya, there exist a structure to be adopted titled â€Å"Procedure 1503†. This structure named after the decree of the UN Commission on Human Rights aims to address consistent patterns of gross, constant and evident contravention of all human rights reported by individuals or non-governmental groups (OHCHR, 2007). Even with existence of this structure and several others like Human Rights Committee that were primarily established to ensure that justified humanitarian interventions takes place without a self interest agenda, several disputation still prevails. It was on this note that, the UN Security Council facilitated the establishment of an authority called the â€Å"International Criminal Court† in 2002 t o deal with concerns of human rights breach prior to, or subsequently in conjunction with the Human Rights Committee, the UN and other key international bodies (CICC, 2002). Despite the opposition faced by this court at it conception by three strong members of the security council namely, the US, Russia and China, the birth of this institute brought about commendable results within it capacity. As regards to the fundamental Human Rights, this institute generated some vital agreements which are enclosed in the ICC fact sheet 1 to administer a positive intention channelled towards protecting, upholding and promotion of human welfare (AI, 2004). Evidently, the UN as the most represented platform within the international community has in various capacity demonstrated that there is an objective of human security to be achieved by prioritizing humanitarian welfare. However, one factor peculiar to the UN is the practice of an odd habit of â€Å"barking without biting†. This attitude has been needlessly prevalent that belligerents no longer regard the regulations of the international community as plausible (Brosche, 2008, p: 103). For example, the sanction authorized against the government of Sudan under the 1591 Resolution of the Security Council was greatly undermined, thus, confirming Khartoum’s conviction that the Security Council is deficient of a strong political determination in the event of a mass killing (Prendergast et al, 2008, p: 6). If I would give my opinion on this toothless bite attitude exemplified by the international community, it will be that of a disappointment. Allowing these tolls of death and then prosecuting the perpetrators several years later is not good enough, preventing crimes against humanity by pre-emption or prompt intervention is not too much. Just like the case of Rwanda, the Darfur crisis was quite speculative. Several NGO’s like Amnesty International, Medecins Sans Frontieres and the International Crisis Group signalled the world concerning the up-rising catastrophe in Darfur sometimes in February, 2003 (AI, 2003, p:1). As most pessimists would have envisage, the dawdling stimulus of the international community and a misplaced priority to conclude the North-South peace agreement in Sudan defiled every necessary pre-emptive action that would have prevented the bloodsheds (HCIDC, 2005, p: 17). Though the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556 of Chapter V11 of the UN Charter which demanded the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed Militia and prosecute its leaders accordingly. Regrettably, the lack of enforcement mechanism coupled with de-motivated political will pointed out the shortcomings of every party that represents the international community (Prendergast et al, 2008, p: 4). Sadly, several years afte r the fatal misery was set in motion, the crises in Darfur still remains a failure of the international community who failed to enforce every strategic steps channelled towards promoting human security in a state that calls for emergency. The discourse of humanitarian intervention invariably summons a R2P. Declaring that the international community has the right to intervene in the affairs of another state is such a huge claim to make (Barnett, 2003, p: 174). However, for the sake of humanity, the international community reserves an ethical motive to preserve and protect the right of the vulnerable through pre-emption and intervention in failed states. Responsibility to Protect The inability of the international community to act proactively in response to the diversified occurrences of mass contravention of human rights witnessed in the post Cold War, and more exclusively in the 1990’s, incited Kofi Annan who was the UN Secretary General to summon the states to come to a resolution regarding the issue of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. This action was triggered after the 1999 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The supporting argument that drives the objective of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty set up by the Canadian Government was that of a R2P. It forwards that, in an event of a state failure to cater for the wellbeing of its people, the international community automatically assumes the R2P in all necessary capacity without necessarily seeking the consent of the host state (Hehir, 2010, p: 249). The definition of sovereignty as outlined in the UN Charter makes it clear that every states reserves a constrained and a regulated right and therefore, entitled to a code of non-interference in it internal matters by external bodies (ICISS, 2001, p:10). However, the ICISS report modified sovereignty from control to sovereignty as responsibility in both domestic and foreign affairs. The term R2P presents this perspective of sovereignty like a new innovation. However, obvious discretion in the past has been in place to curtail state sovereignty which sometimes allows extension into neighbouring states that has portrayed vulnerability to avert their province from being utilised as a breed of terrorist and cross border raids (ICISS, 2001, p:12). To mention just a few is the UN as a whole, the Geneva Conventions, and the Security Council. These bodies have illustrated several actions which limit the sovereignty of a state such as outright sanctions and infrequent interventions e.g. the War in Korea in the early 1950’s. That said, it can be suggested that the ICISS modified version of sovereignty is basically, placing a name on an idea that has pragmatically existed and at the same time impelling force of strength since the late 1940’s. This ‘new’ idea of sovereignty as drawn by the ICISS smoothens out the R2P. Emphasis is placed on the commitment to shield those whose states have failed to protect rather than the responsibility to intervene. In this context, the sole R2P resides within the state. However, the forthcoming rationale in question suggest intervention for the sake of humanity and supports the involvement of military capabilities in deteriorating circumstances, especially when major wreck is targeted towards the civilians and the host state is considered as unwilling, incapacitated or the main perpetrator of the harm itself (ICISS, 2001, p:16). Just like we see in Darfur, the R2P was not readily assumed by the international community. While it was clear that human security was at stake in Darfur, the Security Council was not disposed to adopt military capabilities. Instead of authorizing the intervention with all necessary means as stated in the ICISS document, the Security Council further contradict the norms of the R2P by indicating to function with the terms of the Sudanese Government (Hehir, 2010, p: 249). However, this does not imply that the international community has lost all of its authority or become impaired. Perhaps, it is quite disappointing that the situation in the Darfur region received much awareness; yet, the international community response remains arguably futile (Hehir, 2010, p: 255). While the USA and the UK invoked a bill of legitimacy by invading Iraq and Afghanistan, they have consequently undermined their standings as norms carriers by avoiding their R2P the Darfuris. (Bellamy, 2005, p: 32). Eviden tly, the situation in Darfur reveals clearly, conflicting national interest with political motivation. Even if benevolence was the hallmark of every intervention, the crisis in Darfur suggests that there is no certification that states will act accordingly. Conclusion One big lesson to learnt from the last century is that massive violations of human rights is likely to re-occur except there is a mechanism is put in place to prevent its occurrence. Humanitarian intervention has some controversial stance; hence human security remains difficult to deal with. Not uncontested, the R2P seems like a better solution if objectively employed. However, a shift in the cultural norms of the political chiefs will do a lot of good to the concept. States need to accept limitation on their sovereignty and also to intervene prospectively without exhibiting any form of self interest. Achieving a clear humanitarian objective is more than a mere aspiration. It is essentially crucial and eventually rewarding. Just like the case of Rwanda, the civilians in Darfur deserved protection and could only rely on a third party aid. Promising affirmative statements needs to be put into action to prevent further damage to humanity. Judging from the situation in Darfur, it doesnâ €™t seem that the international community has a proper mechanism to combat humanitarian calamity. And just like the shocking Genocide in Rwanda a couple of years back, the people of Darfur found themselves in another atmosphere of disaster confirming that nothing can be done, except there is a political motivation impelling for it. How to cite Humanitarian Response to Darfur Crisis, Essay examples

Inter Networking Of The Physical Devices †Myassignmenthelp.Com

Question: Discuss About The Inter Networking Of The Physical Devices? Answer: Introduction The IoT works on the inter-networking of the physical devices where there is a proper and the smart connection of the vehicles, buildings and the embedded software, sensors and the actuators. This includes the IoT which works on the senses and controlling the network with creating a better opportunity for the direct integration of the world. Through this, there is a possibility to work with the sensors and the actuators where the technology encompasses through the smart grids and the intelligent transportation platforms as well. (Cui, 2016). The uniqueness is based on identifying about interoperate forms with the offering of advancement in connectivity of devices. The communication covers the different controls with protocols, domains and applications that are important for the advancement of the applications like a smart grid. Solution with IoT As per the research, IoT gadgets have been important to work on the easy transmission of the information. With this, there is a possibility to handle the ongoing form of the input and the customised standards, where the multi-sensor remote is for the FDA that has been set from the preventive operations to coordinate easily with the ECG, heart rate etc. There is other case of the consistency to check on the wearable sensors with the FDA cleared forms and the Visi Mobile that includes the screen fundamental signs and the ECG standards for measuring the rate of heart beat and the breath with body temperature. (Bresciani et al., 2017). The blood tests are important for the check on how the sensor innovation comes with the different developments. They are for handling the key progress factors with the check on how the shoppers can prick the fingers and check with the progression of the blood spots. When one organisation is offering the dried blood, then there is a testing of the same in the ZRT laboratory which includes the accessibility of the options with the report of the intelligence for API in the circulatory system patch which includes the value depending upon the blood tests of the laboratory. (Ho et al., 2016). Visualising the Information The stages are determined with the extensive forms of the volumes, where the IoT works on the information that can easily be used for the intelligible forms of the system. The procedures are set to define about the security of data and to reach towards a particular goal with the major focus on the preparation of the programming data. With this, the data is also able to handle the goals where there are IoT sensor stages to match with the measured forms of the GPS beacons. The checking of the devices and handling the web interfaces is set through the versatile applications and work on the planned graphics of the information. Through this, the data is able to handle the higher determination factor, with the multi-dimensional standards that are found to be reasonable. Data Visualisation Tools These are for proper designing and the assortments mainly set with the online devices. It includes the information perspectives and the consideration is about how the information of the perception features could be set with the comprehending forms of the configuration. The stages are for the proper representation of the information graphics where there are clients to define and make sure of the customised forms of information. (Botta et al., 2016).The subjective patterns are set to handle and work on the envisioning of the arrangements with the word trees and the label mists as well. the word mists and the quantitative information could easily be decided based on the positions of the bar outlines and the histograms. There is a use of the pie graphs, organisation of the graphs, lattice diagrams etc. Exploration of IoT The IoT exploration includes the use of assorted sensor innovation with the Bluetooth connectivity which is important for handling the information transmits. Through this, there is a possibility of the advancement in battery which implies for the agreed positions and appealing for the wearable forms of the screens that could be set through the use of information gathering factors. (Moon et al., 2016). It includes the bundling and evaluating the valuable forms of the standards where there are no less than any organisation who works on the purchase of the items. Pros and Cons of IoT To examine about the system standards, there is a need to define about how there is a possibility of the auto-merging camera. With this, the setup also includes the details about the comprised forms of the setup where there are CCD sensors to handle the venturing of engines and then working on the turning of the hubs and the revolving sections. The venturing is through controlling and handling the rotating development which is to design and work on the camera exchanging point of view. IoT works for the interaction and then allow to work on the complex structures with distributed computing and development. The real-time data applications are set through the logging solutions where the specific software development is to create the software and work on the hardware used in IoT. Conclusion The potential and the transformative energy of IoT is based on the potential with advancements for the reaching of auditing. There are factors to handle the quick and the omnipresent appropriation with the IoT items. (Bresciani et al., 2017). The sensors are costly where the battery life is seen to be the major issue. Hence, with this, the information does not remain consistent and is not available as and when needed. So, it is important that there is an investigation of the information streaming with the customised proposals. Here, there are IoT arrangements which includes certain attainable factor for the execution and to plan about what is important and how to handle the value for execution with better innovation processes. References Botta, A., De Donato, W., Persico, V., Pescap, A. (2016). Integration of cloud computing and internet of things: a survey.Future Generation Computer Systems,56, 684-700. Bresciani, S., Ferraris, A., Del Giudice, M. (2017). The management of organizational ambidexterity through alliances in a new context of analysis: Internet of Things (IoT) smart city projects.Technological Forecasting and Social Change. Cui, X. (2016). The internet of things. InEthical Ripples of Creativity and Innovation(pp. 61-68). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Ho, G., Leung, D., Mishra, P., Hosseini, A., Song, D., Wagner, D. (2016, May). Smart locks: Lessons for securing commodity internet of things devices. InProceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security(pp. 461-472). ACM. Moon, Y., Kim, K. J., Shin, D. H. (2016, July). Voices of the Internet of Things: An Exploration of Multiple Voice Effects in Smart Homes. InInternational Conference on Distributed, Ambient, and Pervasive Interactions(pp. 270-278). Springer International Publishing.